Cite as: 608 U. S.
(2026)
25
KAGAN, J., dissenting
the NAACP, 602 U. S. 1, 9 (2024) and Cooper, 581 U. S., at 308). The plaintiff “must disentangle race from politics by proving that the former drove a district’s lines.” Ante, at 25 (quoting Alexander, 602 U. S., at 9, and Cooper, 581 U. S., at 308; emphasis deleted). In other words, he must show that the State, in drawing that district, had not a political but instead a racial motivation—that it acted for the spe- cific purpose of weakening a minority group’s voting influ- ence. The new Callais requirements, as I’ll soon discuss, are all (concededly) designed to ensure that the plaintiff is held to that “special burden”—which, as the Congress amending Section 2 well understood, is nearly insuperable.5
5 In responding to this dissent, the majority (on its opinion’s penulti- mate page) appears to disclaim this reading. The majority notes first (and this is true enough) that “the dissent states over and over again that our decision requires a §2 plaintiff to prove discriminatory intent.” Ante, at 35. And then the majority’s response: No, a vote-dilution plaintiff need show only that a redistricting “denies members of a racial group the same ‘opportunity’ as other voters to elect the candidates they prefer.” Ibid. That formulation is right, and as shown above, it demands an inquiry into the effects of a scheme on voters’ opportunity to elect candidates. See supra, at 14-15, 17-22. Similarly, the majority claims that it is doing just what White did. See ante, at 35. And White, recall, made an “in- tensely local appraisal” of whether an electoral scheme, when “overlaid” on historical, social, and political “realities,” in fact operated to dilute minority voting strength-in other words, applied an effects test. See supra, at 10-12, and n. 1. So the majority closes its opinion by suggest- ing it is not requiring a vote-dilution plaintiff to present evidence of “dis- criminatory intent.” Ante, at 35. Which, if true, would be welcome news. And welcomer still if lower courts took those last words seriously and allowed Section 2 claims to succeed even absent proof of race-based pur- pose. But I suspect they will not. Because they, like I, will have read the many pages leading up to the majority’s coda. And those pages, both in setting out and in explaining the Callais requirements, make clear that a Section 2 plaintiff has a “special burden” to “demonstrate” that racial rather than political (or other) reasons “drove a district’s lines”—i.e., that “the State intentionally drew its districts to afford minority voters less opportunity.” Ante, at 25–26, 29 (emphasis added). So what the majority hopes to accomplish by its last-minute attempt to associate itself with an effects inquiry is something of a mystery. To try to disguise what it is
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