Bangladesh Bank’s defence of the taka depleted reserves, distorted markets, and delayed inevitable reform
Zahid Hussain, former lead economist of the World Bank. Sketch: TBS
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Zahid Hussain, former lead economist of the World Bank. Sketch: TBS
Bangladesh entered the 2020s with a strong record of external stability.
The taka had remained relatively stable for years, foreign-exchange reserves had risen steadily, and exports and remittances continued to expand. That record came under pressure in 2022 as soaring import costs, tighter global financial conditions, and a stronger US dollar strained the balance of payments.
The initial shock was external. The policy response, however, increasingly became a domestic source of pressure. Rather than allowing the exchange rate to adjust, Bangladesh Bank intervened heavily to defend the taka, selling reserves even as demand for foreign exchange persistently exceeded supply. As pressures intensified, administrative controls increasingly substituted for market adjustment, creating dollar shortages and widening the gap between official and market exchange rates. The effort to preserve stability had begun to undermine it.
Adjustment came only gradually. Exchange-rate management evolved from reserve sales to a system of multiple administered rates, followed by the introduction of a crawling peg in May 2024 and greater flexibility in May 2025. By then, prolonged dollar shortages and substantial reserve losses had exposed the costs of resisting adjustment rather than accommodating it.
What began as a strategy to preserve external stability ended up weakening its foundations. The problem was not the shock itself, but the prolonged effort to prevent the economy from adjusting to it.
From reserve accumulation to dollar shortages
For more than a decade, Bangladesh Bank managed the exchange rate through regular market intervention. Supported by strong export earnings, remittance inflows, and favorable external conditions, official gross foreign-exchange reserves rose from $10.8 billion in FY10 to $36 billion in FY20, peaking at $46.2 billion in September 2021. The pandemic temporarily accelerated that accumulation as imports contracted while remittances remained buoyant. The trend reversed, however, when imports rebounded, commodity prices surged, and US monetary tightening strengthened the dollar.
The current-account deficit widened to about $18.7 billion in FY22. Rather than allowing the exchange rate to adjust fully, Bangladesh Bank intervened heavily to slow depreciation, drawing down reserves to meet excess demand for dollars. Reserves accumulated during years of external stability increasingly became a tool for defending the taka rather than absorbing temporary shocks.
As reserves declined, adjustment shifted from the exchange rate to quantity restrictions. Access to foreign exchange was tightened, letters of credit were restricted, and payment delays became more common. Shortages of dollars disrupted imports of raw materials, machinery, and intermediate goods, creating bottlenecks for production and investment. The economy was adjusting, but through shortages rather than prices.
Illustration: TBS
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Illustration: TBS
In July 2023, Bangladesh Bank adopted the IMF’s BPM6 methodology for reporting reserves, reducing the reported figure by about $6.4 billion through the exclusion of assets not readily available for external payments. The revision revealed a weaker reserve position than previously reported, but it did not change the underlying trend. Reserve losses had been accumulating for more than a year.
Delegating the exchange rate
In September 2022, the Bangladesh Foreign Exchange Dealers’ Association (BAFEDA) and the Association of Bankers, Bangladesh (ABB) began setting separate exchange rates for exports, remittances, and imports. Although presented as an industry initiative, the arrangement was widely understood to have been introduced at Bangladesh Bank’s behest. Exchange-rate setting was effectively delegated to private associations while the central bank retained regulatory authority, blurring responsibility and accountability.
With exchange rates administratively determined, access to scarce dollars increasingly depended on banks’ allocation decisions. The system combined price controls with foreign-exchange rationing, replacing market adjustment with administrative discretion. Multiple rates created opportunities for arbitrage and encouraged transactions outside formal banking channels. The 2024 White Paper documented substantial differences between announced exchange rates and those actually faced by businesses. Rather than resolving shortages, the multiple-rate system redistributed them while encouraging exporters and remittance recipients to seek more attractive rates elsewhere.
The pressures concealed by administered rates became increasingly visible in the informal foreign-exchange market. Monthly-data analysis suggests that a one-percentage-point increase in the informal-market premium was associated with roughly 0.45% greater official taka depreciation in the following month, after controlling for external transactions, relative inflation, and policy regimes. Informal-market prices appeared to anticipate subsequent official adjustments, suggesting that market pressures continued to operate despite administrative controls.
These distortions had broader consequences. Higher informal-market rates encouraged some migrant workers to bypass formal remittance channels. Allegations of capital flight also intensified, particularly involving politically connected individuals. Persistent negative errors and omissions in the balance of payments were consistent with unrecorded net outflows, though not conclusive evidence of capital flight. The multiple-rate system thus reinforced the very shortages it was intended to alleviate by pushing transactions beyond official markets.
Exchange-rate stability had long been regarded as a hallmark of sound macroeconomic management. Concerns about inflation and the domestic-currency cost of external debt help explain the authorities’ reluctance to allow depreciation. Yet the costs of resisting adjustment accumulated through reserve depletion, dollar rationing, and disruptions to trade and production. As in many previous exchange-rate crises, efforts to suppress adjustment did not eliminate it. They merely changed its form.
Mounting external pressures prompted Bangladesh to seek IMF assistance in July 2022. The IMF’s $4.7 billion programme, approved in January 2023, included greater exchange-rate flexibility among its reform objectives. Yet the ABB-BAFEDA arrangement remained in place until the introduction of a crawling peg in May 2024 and survived, in modified form, until greater flexibility was permitted in May 2025. The IMF programme provided a framework for reform, but not sufficient political incentive to accelerate it.
Adjustment deferred, not avoided
The eventual policy correction reflected mounting constraints more than changing preferences. Reserve depletion and persistent dollar shortages made administrative controls increasingly difficult to sustain. Although the IMF programme provided a framework for reform, multiple exchange rates persisted well into 2024. Greater flexibility emerged only when the costs of delaying adjustment became increasingly visible and politically difficult to ignore.
Exchange-rate misalignment is difficult to sustain indefinitely because market pressures continually reveal it. Informal-market premiums signaled underlying dollar scarcity, while declining reserves exposed the costs of intervention. Administrative controls could redistribute scarce foreign exchange, but they could not create it. As economist Herbert Stein observed, “If something cannot go on forever, it will stop.” Bangladesh’s exchange-rate regime eventually encountered that reality. Adjustment was deferred, not avoided. Greater flexibility emerged not because policymakers became more willing to adjust, but because the alternatives became increasingly unsustainable.
Zahid Hussain is a former chief economist of the World Bank, Dhaka Office
