Record remittance inflows hide a migration system still broken by high fees, syndicates, and weak institutions.
Sketch of Zahid Hussain. Photo: TBS
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Sketch of Zahid Hussain. Photo: TBS
Bangladesh’s migrant workers sent home a record $35.6 billion in officially recorded remittances in FY26, providing a vital source of foreign exchange and supporting millions of households.
Overseas employment has also partly compensated for the domestic economy’s limited capacity to generate productive jobs. Over time, remittances have become not merely a development success story but a pillar of macroeconomic stability.
This success has occurred with remarkably little institutional transformation. Many of the governance problems that have long characterised the migration sector remained largely unchanged. Migration governance remains characterised by high recruitment costs, heavy reliance on informal finance, limited access to affordable credit, and persistent allegations of politically connected recruitment syndicates.
Illustration: TBS
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Illustration: TBS
The puzzle is not how remittances became important. It is why a sector so central to Bangladesh’s economy continues to operate with many of the same governance weaknesses that have long accompanied it.
The price of leaving
Overseas employment often begins with debt. The 2024 White Paper reports that migration from Bangladesh to Qatar cost roughly four times as much as migration from Nepal to the same destination in 2018-19. Similar disparities existed for Malaysia and Saudi Arabia. The average male Bangladeshi migrant paid around $5,500, an amount that could require up to 17 months of overseas earnings to recover.
Opaque arrangements among recruitment agencies, subagents, and visa brokers enable excessive charges. The White Paper documents how restrictions on recruiting agencies for Malaysia facilitated syndicates linked to parliamentarians, cabinet members, and ruling-party organisations. Access to overseas employment functions as a source of politically protected rents rather than a competitive market for recruitment services.
The persistence of these charges surfaced again in October 2026, when the Saudi ambassador questioned why Bangladeshi workers paid recruitment costs, including airfare, that Saudi employers were supposed to cover. The state minister for expatriates’ welfare reportedly described the remarks as a revelation, prompting protests from recruiting agencies. More revealing than the exchange itself was what it suggested: practices long viewed as routine within Bangladesh’s migration system appeared anomalous even to key stakeholders.
The White Paper estimates that visa purchases over the preceding decade may have involved Tk1.34 trillion in informal payments. Although necessarily based on assumptions, the estimate suggests the scale of migration-related transactions occurring outside formal financial channels. These payments have implications that extend beyond recruitment costs. Payments to overseas visa brokers create demand for dollars abroad, which informal networks satisfy using migrant earnings. Recruitment rents and remittance diversion are connected: the same informal networks that facilitate costly migration underpin demand for foreign exchange created by migration itself.
The invisible remittances
During 2022-2024, large numbers of Bangladeshis migrated for work, yet official remittance inflows failed to rise proportionately. The disconnect reflects an important distinction. Money reaching migrant families does not necessarily generate foreign-exchange inflows through official channels. Through informal networks such as hundi, migrants pay foreign currency abroad while their families receive taka from local intermediaries, bypassing the banking system altogether.
The data suggest that migration and official remittances are shaped by different forces. Monthly analysis indicates that an additional 100,000 migrant departures were associated with roughly 11 percentage points higher growth in official remittances three months later. At the same time, a one-percentage-point increase in the informal-market exchange-rate premium was associated with about two percentage points lower remittance growth in the following month, controlling for other factors. While migration expanded the potential supply of remittances, exchange-rate distortions influenced how those remittances were transferred. The greater the advantage offered by informal channels, the smaller the share of migrant earnings that appeared in official statistics.
Official remittances surged after the August 2024 political transition, despite no comparable increase in the overseas workforce or its earnings. One plausible explanation is that the channels competing with official remittance flows were disrupted. The fall of the previous regime weakened networks facilitating politically connected illicit financial transfers abroad, reducing demand for migrant foreign exchange through hundi operators. As that demand diminished, informal channels lost some of their advantage over the banking system, encouraging a shift toward official remittance channels. The surge in recorded remittances may therefore have reflected not only higher inflows from abroad, but also a reallocation of existing flows from informal to formal channels.
The missing institutions
There has been progress in remittance delivery. Bangladesh Bank reports that remittances received through mobile financial services grew by more than 70% in 2025, allowing migrant families to receive money directly into digital wallets. Reported transfer costs have also fallen, although some major corridors remain above the SDG target of 5%. These improvements stand in sharp contrast to the persistent weaknesses in migration finance, recruitment governance, and worker protection.
Successive governments have celebrated migrant workers as “remittance warriors” and maintained a 2.5% cash incentive for remittances. Banks compete vigorously to receive migrants’ earnings but have done far less to finance their recruitment and ticket abroad. Despite the existence of a dedicated migrants’ bank, workers remain heavily dependent on costly informal borrowing to meet recruitment expenses.
Commercial banks face high transaction costs in making small loans, while microfinance institutions, despite their broader reach, often charge relatively high interest rates. Even the dedicated migrants’ bank has reached only a small fraction of departing workers. As a result, excessive recruitment costs continue to be financed largely through family resources and informal borrowing.
A 2022 World Bank study of 5,000 return migrants highlights a striking paradox. Many Bangladeshis were able to borrow substantial sums to finance migration, accumulate savings abroad, and return home to start businesses. Yet they often faced much greater difficulty obtaining formal finance for those businesses in Bangladesh. Nearly seven in ten employed returnees in the study’s non-agricultural sample were self-employed or employers. Migration thus served as an expensive substitute for entrepreneurial finance. Workers could borrow to leave the country, but not easily invest at home.
Reform without transformation
Bangladesh has expanded its migration institutions without comparable improvements in their effectiveness. Expanding training facilities has not translated into a comparable expansion of skilled placements. The state-owned Bangladesh Overseas Employment and Services Limited (BOESL), established in 1984 to facilitate low-cost recruitment, placed about 161,000 workers abroad over its first four decades, compared with roughly 16 million through private agencies. BOESL has demonstrated that lower-cost recruitment is possible, but its limited scale has done little to challenge entrenched recruitment practices.
Bangladesh’s dependence on less-skilled migration is often contrasted with the higher remittances per worker earned by migrants from countries such as the Philippines and Sri Lanka. Low-skilled migration is not itself evidence of malfunction. The weak link in the chain is the connection between training systems and access to better-paying opportunities abroad. The White Paper reports that BMET operated 110 technical training centers offering 55 vocations, but found little evidence that trainees successfully secured overseas employment.
Efforts to make agency performance transparent have moved slowly. Work on a rating system began in 2014, and classification rules were adopted only in 2020, partly under World Bank development-policy conditions. Whether these ratings now provide prospective migrants with reliable information remains unclear. But information asymmetries are salient in shaping market performance.
Success despite the system
The attraction of higher wages abroad has sustained demand for migration despite excessive recruitment costs and weak institutional support. Remittance success has therefore persisted without corresponding improvements in migration governance. Politically protected recruitment rents, information asymmetries, and informal financial networks remain deeply embedded in the system. Bangladesh has learned to depend on its migrant workers without learning to serve them nearly as well. Success came because migrants overcame institutional weaknesses, not because those weaknesses were resolved.
Zahid Hussain is a former lead economist of the World Bank, Dhaka office.
