(“[E]vidence of ‘other crimes, wrongs, or acts’ may not be admitted for the purpose of ‘prov[ing] the character of a person in order to show action in conformity therewith.” (quoting Rule 404(b)); State v. Perry, 430 S.C. 24, 29, 842 S.E.2d 654, 657 (2020) (“The rule is often stated in terms of ‘propensity.””); State v. Benton, 338 S.C. 151, 156, 526 S.E.2d 228, 230 (2000) (“Propensity evidence is admissible if offered for some purpose other than to show the accused is a bad person or he acted in conformity with his prior convictions.”); Perry, 430 S.C. at 44, 842 S.E.2d at 665 (“The State must show a logical connection between the other crime and the crime charged such that the evidence of other crimes ‘reasonably tends to prove a material fact in issue.” (quoting State v. Lyle, 125 S.C. 406, 417, 118 S.E. 803, 807 (1923))); State v. Clasby, 385 S.C. 148, 155-56, 682 S.E.2d 892, 896 (2009) (“Even if prior bad act evidence… falls within an exception, it must be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice to the defendant.” (quoting State v. Gaines, 380 S.C. 23, 29, 667 S.E.2d 728, 731 (2008)) (citing Rule 403, SCRE)).
As to Rule 404(b), the difficulty lies in the application of these principles to the facts and circumstances of any individual case. Lyle, 125 S.C. at 417, 118 S.E. at 807. Here, the trial court correctly understood the applicable principles of law and thoughtfully applied those principles to the facts and circumstances before it. The trial court explained its view of the logical connection between the financial crimes and Murdaugh’s motive. The State’s argument that it presented a valid theory of motive and Murdaugh’s response that the “fabricated motive theory” is “illogical, implausible” and not supported by the evidence was not a dispute for the trial court to resolve by making this evidentiary ruling; that was for the jury. The trial court’s job was to determine—in its discretion—whether the State’s theory of motive was reasonably plausible, and if so, whether the evidence the State presented could reasonably support the theory. We agree with the State that under the facts and circumstances in existence in Murdaugh’s first trial—the trial court acted within its discretion in deciding not to exclude the evidence under Rule 404(b).
As to Rule 403, the trial court balanced the probative value of the evidence against its potential for unfair prejudice and concluded the probative value was not substantially outweighed by any unfair prejudice. The trial court specifically found Murdaugh’s commission of the financial crimes “does not suggest to the jury that the defendant has a tendency to commit murder.” As we will discuss below, we find considerable unfair prejudice in allowing the State to go as far and deep into detail as it did. However, we hold the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting some evidence of Murdaugh’s financial crimes. See Morris v. BB&T Corp., 438 S.C. 582, 587, 885 S.E.2d 394, 397 (2023) (“[W]hen a trial court’s . . . thought process of
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