Bangladesh’s economic transformation was accompanied by substantial financial deepening. Private banks expanded, microfinance reached millions of households, and capital markets and insurance companies grew. New financial services broadened access to savings, credit, payments, and risk protection. In principle, these developments should have strengthened the financial system’s ability to mobilise savings, finance productive investment, and manage risk.
Yet financial deepening coincided with institutional regression. Political connections, powerful business interests, and regulatory forbearance progressively weakened financial discipline. Banks accumulated distressed assets, capital markets struggled to attract investment, and insurers increasingly failed in their basic obligation to protect policyholders. The puzzle is not why Bangladesh deepened its financial system, but why greater financial depth failed to produce stronger financial intermediation and discipline.
Banking reform transformed the sector’s ownership structure. According to the World Bank’s Change of Fabric (2022), private banks held 37% of banking assets in 2001, compared with 46% for state-owned commercial banks. By December 2024, those shares had shifted to 70% and 23%, respectively. Financial deepening was therefore accompanied by a profound shift from public to private ownership.
Microfinance, agent banking, mobile financial services, and digital payments extended financial access beyond conventional bank branches. Yet the World Bank’s Global Findex 2025 reports that only 43% of Bangladeshi adults held an account in 2024, including mobile money accounts, down from 53% in 2021. Among women, account ownership was just 33%. Financial infrastructure expanded, but broad-based financial inclusion remained elusive.
Banks continued to attract deposits despite negative real interest rates. Limited investment alternatives, transaction needs, and established savings habits sustained deposit growth. This resilience in savings mobilisation should have provided a foundation for productive lending. Whether the financial system succeeded in transforming those savings into productive investment is a different question.
Where did the credit go?
The divergence between deposit growth and private lending widened sharply. Annual additions to bank deposits rose from Tk 1.48 trillion in FY24 to Tk 2.01 trillion in FY26, while additions to private credit fell from Tk 1.47 trillion to Tk 0.78 trillion. The private sector’s share of incremental domestic credit consequently declined from 78% to 32%. A growing pool of financial savings was therefore no longer translating into a comparable expansion of private-sector financing.
Both demand and supply factors contributed to weaker private lending. Higher borrowing costs and economic uncertainty discouraged investment, while the recognition of previously concealed problem loans constrained banks’ lending capacity. Government securities also became increasingly attractive relative to risky private loans. These factors help explain the recent slowdown, but not the longer-term weakness in financial intermediation.
The problem extends beyond the recent slowdown. Empirical analysis finds no statistically significant relationship between private credit growth and either private investment or GDP growth. In other words, periods of faster credit expansion were not consistently associated with higher investment or stronger economic performance. This raises a more fundamental concern: financial deepening may have expanded the volume of credit without reliably improving the allocation of capital to productive uses.
The erosion of banking discipline
As Bangladesh Bank tightened classification standards, the reported nonperforming-loan ratio rose from 20.2% at the end of 2024 to 30.6% at the end of 2025, revealing losses that had accumulated over many years rather than a sudden deterioration in asset quality. The rise in NPLs largely reflected years of distress concealed through rescheduling, regulatory concessions, and delayed loss recognition. By December 2025, nonperforming loans accounted for 44.4% of lending by state-owned commercial banks and 28.3% by private commercial banks. The shift from public to private ownership had not translated into stronger credit discipline.
Inflation, exchange-rate depreciation, rising energy costs, and slower economic activity weakened borrowers’ repayment capacity. Yet banking vulnerabilities long predated these shocks. Repeated regulatory accommodation allowed distressed loans to remain on bank balance sheets without adequate recognition of losses.
Bangladesh Bank’s shortcomings reflected more than technical constraints. Its strategic plans envisaged implementing Basel III prudential standards by 2019, yet enforcement of capital adequacy, loan classification, and provisioning remained weak. The central bank repeatedly intervened in lending and deposit rates while granting concessions to distressed borrowers. It could articulate international standards but failed to enforce financial discipline consistently.
The consequences are evident in Bangladesh Bank’s Financial Stability Report 2025. By December 2025, the banking sector’s capital adequacy ratio had fallen to negative 2.64%, exhausting its capital conservation buffer. Islamic banks were particularly distressed, recording an aggregate capital adequacy ratio of negative 43.2%. Profitability also deteriorated, leaving the banking system increasingly exposed to future shocks.
The political economy of capture
The erosion of banking discipline was not merely a supervisory failure. It reflected the growing influence of politically connected business groups over banks and their regulators.
Private banking was intended partly to overcome the weaknesses of state-directed credit. But private ownership did not ensure independent lending decisions. Politically connected business groups could control bank management, obtain preferential credit, and secure regulatory concessions, reproducing many of the allocation failures that private banking had been expected to overcome.
The 2017 takeover of Islami Bank Bangladesh illustrates the broader dynamics of capture. A conglomerate closely connected to the ruling establishment, gained control of one of the country’s leading private banks. Subsequent allegations of extensive lending to group-linked companies demonstrated how politically protected control could transform a bank entrusted with depositors’ savings into an instrument of private appropriation.
Akerlof and Romer’s (1993) analysis of “bankruptcy for profit” offers a revealing parallel. They showed how weak capital requirements, accounting rules that concealed losses, and regulatory forbearance could make it profitable for bank owners to extract resources even when their institutions were headed toward insolvency. Unlike excessive risk-taking in pursuit of uncertain gains, such looting could be profitable even if the bank never succeeded. Bangladesh’s experience suggests how connected lending, concealed losses, and regulatory concessions can enable private extraction at the expense of financial institutions and their depositors. Institutions intended to constrain vested interests increasingly accommodated them.
Capture beyond banking
The 2010-11 stock market crash exposed serious weaknesses in market regulation. An investigation led by the late Dr. Khondkar Ibrahim Khaled documented manipulation, irregularities in share issuance, and failures of regulatory oversight. The collapse inflicted heavy losses on retail investors and damaged confidence in the equity market. The failure to establish credible safeguards against manipulation helps explain why the stock market has struggled to regain investors’ trust more than a decade later.
Regulatory failures persisted. In October 2025, the Bangladesh Securities and Exchange Commission permanently barred its former chairman from capital-market activities for misconduct involving mutual-fund investments. Meanwhile, market capitalisation on the Dhaka Stock Exchange fell from 15.6% of GDP in 2023 to 10.3% in July 2026, while the number of listed securities declined from 654 to 638. The market’s failure to deepen suggests that weak governance and fragile investor confidence continue to limit its capacity to serve as a meaningful alternative to bank financing.
Insurance suffered similar regulatory failures. Politically influenced licensing expanded the number of insurers without ensuring effective supervision. A former chairman of the Insurance Development and Regulatory Authority faced allegations of soliciting bribes for regulatory approvals. Meanwhile, life insurers settled only about two-thirds of claims due in 2024. Investigations exposed large-scale misappropriation of policyholders’ funds, and insurance penetration remained around 0.5% of GDP. These failures undermined confidence in insurance as a mechanism for managing risk, helping explain why insurance penetration remained exceptionally low.
The cost of institutional regression
The cost of institutional regression becomes clearer in international comparison. Change of Fabric (2022), drawing on the IMF’s Financial Development Index, shows Bangladesh lagging behind India, Vietnam, Indonesia, and China in overall financial development. The gap reflects weaknesses in both financial institutions and capital markets. While these economies developed broader channels for mobilising savings and financing investment, Bangladesh remained heavily dependent on a banking system increasingly burdened by distressed assets.
In Finance and the Good Society, Robert Shiller argues that finance should serve human welfare by mobilising resources, enabling productive enterprise, and helping people manage risk. Judged against that standard, Bangladesh’s financial system has failed not only its depositors, investors, and policyholders but also the wider economy. The greatest cost of financial capture lies not in the losses already recorded, but in the investment, innovation, and economic opportunities that never materialised.
Zahid Hussain, former lead economist, World Bank Dhaka office. Sketch: TBS
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Zahid Hussain, former lead economist, World Bank Dhaka office. Sketch: TBS
