Repeated reforms expanded Bangladesh Bank’s mandate on paper, yet political, bureaucratic, and business pressures have steadily hollowed out its independence.
Zahid Hussain, former lead economist, World Bank Dhaka office. Sketch: TBS
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Zahid Hussain, former lead economist, World Bank Dhaka office. Sketch: TBS
Once regarded as a center of professional excellence within Bangladesh’s public sector, Bangladesh Bank’s ability to exercise independent judgment has eroded over time. Even as its statutory responsibilities expanded, it became increasingly subordinate to the executive branch and vulnerable to pressure from powerful business interests.
Paradoxically, this erosion occurred amid persistent calls for greater central bank autonomy. Successive reforms expanded BB’s formal responsibilities, yet changes in institutional arrangements moved in the opposite direction, weakening its capacity to discharge those responsibilities independently.
Not that it always wanted to. The puzzle is not the absence of reform, but why repeated reforms failed to translate into greater operational autonomy.
The duality of banking regulation
BB is the statutory banking regulator, yet the Financial Institutions Division (FID) exercises parallel authority over state-owned banks, constraining the BB’s ability to enforce its supervisory standards and conflating regulatory signals.
Infograph: TBS
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Infograph: TBS
In early 2026, FID allegedly opposed independent Asset Quality Reviews of state-owned banks under a World Bank-supported reform project, fearing that the findings would expose further financial distress and undermine public confidence. The World Bank apparently resisted dropping the reviews but agreed to consider modifying their requirements. The episode revealed FID’s ability to challenge BB’s efforts to establish the true condition of institutions under its supervision.
The conflict of interest is fundamental. Through FID, the government simultaneously acts as owner and overseer of state-owned banks while constraining their regulator. When prudential requirements conflict with ownership interests, enforcement becomes vulnerable to compromise. The signal to banks and borrowers is consequential: supervisory decisions may be negotiated rather than applied consistently.
The establishment of the FID within the Ministry of Finance in 2009-10 created a parallel bureaucratic authority over banking. Earlier, Bangladesh had abolished its separate Banking Division in 1998 and transferred its responsibilities to the Finance Division. The creation of the new division reversed that consolidation, restoring a separate chain of influence over the banking system.
FID oversees state-owned financial institutions, administers relevant legislation, and supposedly coordinates with BB. Through appointments, administrative approvals, and policy decisions, it can influence supervisory outcomes without formally exercising regulatory authority. The result is a blurred division between government ownership and prudential supervision, weakening accountability for both.
Unsurprisingly, the parallel structure has not delivered. By December 2024, state-owned commercial banks had a capital adequacy ratio of negative 8.4 percent against a regulatory minimum of 10 percent. Nonperforming loans reached 45.8 percent by March 2025. At Janata Bank, 72 percent of loans were nonperforming at the end of 2024, alongside a capital shortfall of nearly Tk 52,900 crore.
The triangle of influence
Debates over central bank autonomy have traditionally emphasised fiscal dominance: the risk that government financing needs override monetary-policy objectives. This perspective captures only part of the problem.
BB’s challenge extends beyond fiscal dominance. It operates within a triangle of influence: fiscal authorities seeking accommodation for government financing, bureaucratic authorities exercising control through appointments and administrative approvals, and politically connected businesses pressing for favorable credit conditions and regulatory concessions. Central-bank autonomy is constrained not by a single principal, but by multiple centers of power.
Consultation between central banks and business representatives is common internationally. In Bangladesh, however, formal meetings between business leaders and the governor have increasingly become forums for negotiating prudential requirements. Consultation has gradually given way to bargaining over loan classification, rescheduling, provisioning, and other regulatory obligations.
Exceptional treatment is a recurring expectation rather than a rare exception. In 2025, Bangladesh Bank approved special loan rescheduling for roughly 250 companies, permitting repayment periods of up to 15 years with down payments as low as 1 percent. By December, around 300 companies had sought restructuring or rescheduling of loans totaling Tk 2 trillion. In August 2026, the central bank extended similar repayment terms to borrowers with loans exceeding Tk 1,000 crore, including previous beneficiaries. Such concessions reinforce the belief that regulatory obligations are negotiable and that distress would eventually be accommodated rather than resolved.
Autonomy deferred
In 2025, BB’s board approved amendments to the BB Order intended to protect the tenure of the governor and deputy governors, reduce government representation on the board, and strengthen the central bank’s authority over administration and financial regulation.
Submitted to the finance ministry in October 2025, the proposal remained stalled until 5 February 2026, when the finance adviser recommended leaving the matter to the next elected government. A reform intended to protect BB from executive interference had itself become subject to executive discretion. Bureaucratic delay achieved what outright rejection might have made politically costly.
On 25 February 2026, just nine days after taking office, the new government abruptly removed the governor and appointed his successor. The outgoing governor reportedly learned of the decision through television reports. Within hours, FID issued notifications terminating his tenure and naming a replacement. The government offered no substantive justification beyond its right to pursue different priorities.The episode demonstrated how little practical protection deferred legislation provided when political authorities chose to act.
More powers, less authority
Central bank autonomy does not preclude policy coordination or public accountability. It requires the freedom to exercise professional judgment without political, bureaucratic, or commercial interference.
BB acquired broader responsibilities as the economy expanded. The 2003 amendments to the BB Order clarified its responsibilities for monetary policy, reserve management, foreign exchange, payment systems, and financial supervision. Expansion of responsibilities came without a comparable expansion of institutional autonomy.
The World Bank-supported Central Bank Strengthening Project modernised BB’s operations, introduced automated payment systems, and improved information infrastructure. Technical modernisation, however, did not secure institutional independence. BB acquired more sophisticated tools without gaining the authority to contest bureaucratic interference.
Despite the 2003 reforms, the executive retained control over senior appointments and substantial influence over BB’s board. De jure and de facto executive powers of superintendence and direction are preserved. The finance minister leads the council mandated to coordinate monetary, fiscal, and exchange-rate policies.
BB cannot be the US Federal Reserve, nor does it need to be. Yet the question remains: why has the Reserve Bank of India sustained a strong professional identity, while the central banks of Sri Lanka and even Pakistan, from whose institutional legacy BB emerged, have pursued stronger statutory protections despite formidable political pressures?
None is immune from executive interference. Yet BB has struggled to defend even its existing regulatory authority. The deeper puzzle is not whether executive influence exists, but why Bangladesh’s political economy has proven so resistant to a professionally independent central bank.
Zahid Hussain is a former chief economist of The World Bank Dhaka office
