Alarm failure and poor supervision also cited
Bus mangled as high-speed train rams into it at level crossing in Cumilla on 22 March 2026. Photo: TBS
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Bus mangled as high-speed train rams into it at level crossing in Cumilla on 22 March 2026. Photo: TBS
A railway investigation has found that negligence by four gatekeepers, including an unauthorised duty swap for money and failure to lower the barrier, led to the train–bus collision in Cumilla that killed 12 passengers, including three children.
The accident occurred at 2:55am on 22 March at the Paduar Bazar rail crossing in Cumilla Sadar South upazila on the Dhaka-Chattogram highway.
A Mamun Special bus travelling from Chuadanga to Lakshmipur collided with a mail train travelling from Chattogram to Dhaka.
The train dragged the bus for around 700 metres before stopping at a place called Doyara.
The bus was crushed, leaving 12 passengers dead and at least 24 others, including the driver, seriously injured.
All the casualties were passengers of the bus.
In a case filed by a relative of one of the victims, RAB and police have so far arrested three gatekeepers from the crossing.
According to the investigation, citing the statement of gatekeeper Md Helal Uddin, he and Md Mehedi Hasan were scheduled to be on duty at the crossing on the night of 21 March but left for their village homes to celebrate Eid without informing authorities.
Helal Uddin swapped duty with two other gatekeepers, Nazmul Hossain and Kawsar Hossain, in exchange for Tk1,000. However, both Nazmul and Kawsar fell asleep while on duty that night.
As a result, the gate barrier was not lowered when the train approached, allowing a passenger bus onto the tracks and leading to the collision.
The railway formed a six-member departmental probe committee led by Chattogram Divisional Transport Officer (DTO) Anisur Rahman, which found negligence by all four gatekeepers.
The investigation also identified infrastructure weaknesses. The alarm bell and IP phone were not operational due to a lack of electricity at the crossing.
Facilities such as toilets, water and electricity were inadequate in the gatekeepers’ room, and the railway’s engineering department failed to ensure proper supervision.
The report held Cumilla’s senior sub-assistant engineer (way), Anisuzzaman, indirectly responsible for failing to supervise the gatekeepers’ duties.
It also found that the long-distance bus was supposed to use the flyover but instead used the level crossing.
The report said the bus driver was also responsible for the collision, as he did not follow warning signs or comply with relevant provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act while crossing the railway line.
Anisur Rahman, head of the railway probe committee, said the key causes of the accident had been identified and several recommendations made to prevent similar incidents.
Houses built by RHD obstruct visibility
A separate probe by the Cumilla district administration identified nearly identical causes behind the collision.
Two structures built by the Roads and Highways Department (RHD) near the crossing for a U-loop obstruct clear visibility of the railway line.
The report also highlighted negligence by the four gatekeepers – Md Helal Uddin, Md Mehedi Hasan, Kawsar Hossain and Nazmul Hossain – as well as the assistant station master of Lalmai railway station.
It further noted the driver’s lack of skill and poor judgement. The driver failed to check both sides before crossing.
A four-lane railway overpass exists at the location, and the bus was supposed to use it. Instead, it used the level crossing, leading to the loss of lives.
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